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Big Business, Politics and Money in Australia 
 
 
The flow of business money to political parties is a vital issue for Australian 
democracy.  Nonetheless, there has been no systematic study of why Australian 
businesses contribute to political parties and why they contribute more to one party 
than to others.  I exploit Australian Electoral Commission data on payments to 
parties by 450 large businesses over seven years at the Commonwealth and State 
levels.  Economic characteristics (income and sector) are important to understanding 
which businesses make political contributions.  However, they are little help in 
understanding how businesses distribute their cash.  This is best interpreted as an 
interaction of ideological bias and political pragmatism.  If Labor has the political 
advantage businesses tend to split contributions evenly between the ALP and the 
Coalition.  If the Coalition has the political advantage businesses overwhelmingly 
target their contributions on the Liberal and National parties. 
 
 
Introduction 
Australian political parties are hugely dependent on Australian business for their 
funding.  This raises the obvious and important question of why businesses contribute 
to political parties?  If business contributions are motivated by self-interest what does 
the political system provide in return?  Of course, this subject has generated a 
substantial amount of academic and non-academic discussion.  The extant literature 
tends to be normative, legal and anecdotal.1  It is normative because it has 
concentrated on the deficiencies of the system in comparison to liberal democratic 
values (Young and Tham 2006).  It is legal in that it has tended to be written by 
                                                 
1 The exception is the work of Ramsay et al. (2002)  However, they examined the donations at the 
federal level only over three years.  Moreover, they presented a purely descriptive analysis. 
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lawyers and therefore unsurprisingly has traced the evolution of statute law and its 
interpretation by the courts (Orr 2007; Tham 2003).  The anecdotal nature of the 
literature is evident in the frequent citation and recapitulation of various scandals and 
controversies that have been primarily researched by journalists or public inquiries.  
These contributions are valuable can sometimes be frustrating to read because, by 
design, they can tell us little or nothing about the overall interaction of parties and 
business that makes this an important subject in the first place.  This article aims to 
begin to fill that gap by exploiting the huge amount of data generated by the 
disclosure regime operated by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).  By 
systematically studying the relationship between the flow of cash from business to 
parties and political conditions and firm characteristics it is possible to gain an 
important insight into how and why businesses contribute to political parties.   
 
Theory 
Business contributions to political parties consist of two decisions.  Firstly, a business 
must decide to make a political contribution and then it must decide how to distribute 
a certain amount of money.  It can give all of its money to a political party; it can 
decide to split it equally between competing parties; or it can decide to bias its 
payments towards one party, without completely abandoning the competition.  Most 
studies of political finance use one of these decisions as their dependent variable.  In 
this article, I look first at the decision to contribute and then how biased that 
contribution is. 
 
I take business to refer to a profit seeking privately owned organisation, including 
both companies and partnerships.  Businesses, in this sense, only form a part of the 
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overall business community, which is active in both politics generally and in the 
funding of political parties.  Thus, I exclude state-owned firms, wealthy individuals 
and business interest organisations.  While these other types of ‘business’ actors are 
important, they are subject to quite different sets of incentives.  The motivations of 
businesses contributing financially to political parties can be thought of broadly as 
either pragmatic or ideological (Clawson and Neustadtl 1989, 751).  Ideological 
decisions do not survive a cost-benefit analysis and are instead motivated by a long-
term commitment to a class interest or even the wider public good.  Pragmatic 
contributions are business decisions motivated by the relatively short-term profit 
motive of a particular organisation.   
 
Political contributions in Australia, as in several other rich democracies, are widely 
acknowledge as purchasing political access for businesses.  Large contributors can 
demand one-to-one meetings with ministers at relatively short notice.  Smaller 
contributions often grant business representatives the chance to mingle with 
politicians at dinners or receptions or attend a privileged advanced presentation of 
upcoming policy initiatives.  Businesses and politicians deny that contributors receive 
decisions or influence in return for cash.  Instead, they merely receive an opportunity 
to state their case or clarify some misunderstanding.  The standard riposte is that 
 
 If access is indeed the goal of … contributions, will [contributors] settle merely for the 
“opportunity to persuade”?  Won’t they expect success in a certain number of 
instances? Will they be satisfied with an invitation to the gaming table if they lose 
every spin of the wheel? (Souraf 2003, 409). 
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Some businesses go further and deny that they gain any benefit from the sale of 
access.  Large companies are harassed by political parties and feel they must make 
some contribution to fundraising and send some representative to events even if these 
activities make no difference to their ability to lobby successfully (Bachelard, et al. 
2007).  While neither of these two ‘defences’ of the access system can be falsified by 
the pattern of contributions, both have an implication that should be observable in the 
AEC data.  If those who have purchased access have no greater policy success than 
those who have not, the partisan bias of contributions should not reflect changes in 
political competition.  In other words, contributions should be not follow political 
power because access does not grant influence over political power.  Similarly, if 
contributions do not even buy access they should not follow political power.  Another 
implication might be that contributions are most likely to be made by the largest 
firms, which can afford to literally waste money on politicians. 
 
The funding of political parties is located at the interface of politics and the economy.  
Therefore, I think of pragmatism as rooted in either the political system or the firm.  
Political pragmatism is a reaction to the supply of political benefits as reflected in the 
changing conditions of party competition.  Economic pragmatism is a reaction to the 
demand for political benefits as reflected in the particular conditions of a firm’s 
position in economic competition.   I will test the extent to which ideology, political 
pragmatism and economic pragmatism can explain both the decision to make a 
political contribution and the decision on the distribution of that contribution amongst 
political parties.   
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If businesses react to political conditions, they essentially make calculations 
depending on which party is in power and which party they think will exercise power 
in the future: they look at incumbency and polls.   These two variables interact with 
the electoral timetable.  The farther away the next election, the more sense it makes to 
contribute to the governing party and not to the opposition.  The closer an election, the 
more sense it makes to contribute to the party leading in the polls and not necessarily 
to the incumbent government.  The extensive American literature on political finance 
has tried to summarise the characteristics of individual firms using a wide variety of 
variables.  Only three of these have been consistently significant: size, regulation and 
reliance on defence contracts (Burris 2001, 371).  Instead of trying to proxy the 
diversity of the economy with one sector, I am able to include dummy variables for 
the sector of the firm.  In contrast to the diversity of different types of business, it is 
possible to state some clear general hypotheses for the effect of size on the dependent 
variables.  The greater a firm’s income, the proportionally smaller becomes the same 
cash contribution.  The cost of political contributions may be so small relative to the 
income of the business that virtually any policy benefit would justify the expense.  
Therefore, large businesses are more likely to contribute to political parties.  They are 
also more likely to distribute their contributions across the political spectrum: large 
firms may not have to choose between political actors because they have the resources 
to make substantial contributions to all relevant political players.   In terms of the 
ideological logic, there seems to be no alternative to treating it as a residual category.  
I will infer ideological motivation from a political preference for the traditionally pro-
business party that is not explained by measures of political and economic 
pragmatism.   
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I assume the Liberal-National coalition is the traditionally pro-business party.   It is 
commonplace to treat the ‘semi-permanent coalition’ of the Liberals and Nationals as 
one party for many purposes (Sharman and Moon 2003, 241).  The Liberals were 
traditionally, and sometimes almost literally, the party of business.  In recent decades, 
they have distanced themselves from firms and their interest organisations 
(McEachern 1992).  The relationship between the Howard government and business 
has often been tense and tetchy.  Business has been irritated by the government’s 
regulatory instincts, while the Liberals have doubted the loyalty of the business 
community.  Nevertheless, the Coalition is clearly a centre-right party facing a centre-
left party in the Australian Labor Party (ALP).  The ALP has a socialist past and still 
maintains close links with labor unions.   In the 1980s and 90s, it was the Labor party 
which deregulated and globalised the Australian economy (McEachern 1992).  
Especially in the last decade, both main parties have begun to cultivate their relations 
with business as part of the fundraising race.   
 
Data 
The sample consists of 450 businesses, which featured in the 1000 largest enterprises 
in Australia in both 1998/99 and 2004/2005.2  This research design allows me to 
examine both the decision to contribute and the decision about how to distribute a 
given cash amount.  The economic variables are income and dummies for twenty-nine 
sectors.  The political variables are an interaction of incumbency and the electoral 
timetable and an interaction of opinion polls and the electoral timetable.  The 
                                                 
2 Size is measured by income in billions of Australian dollars as reported in the Business Review 
Weekly.  The sample excludes state-owned, non-profit, New Zealand and Papua New Guinean 
enterprises.  Partnerships have been included. 
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incumbency variable ranges from one for a Coalition government with four years to a 
mandatory election to eight for a Labor government with four years to a mandatory 
election.3  The poll variable is the difference between the Labor and Coalition votes 
multiplied by a range beginning at one for an election year and four for four years 
until the next election.4  Please see Appendix A for descriptive statistics on these 
variables. 
 
The Australian Electoral Commission reports disclosures of donations and ‘other 
payments’ to both political parties and entities associated with those parties.  
Donations are defined narrowly as payments for which nothing was received in return.  
All analyses in this article are conducted twice, first for donations and secondly for all 
payments, which includes both donations and other payments.  The basic measure of 
distribution is called bias, calculated as the Labor proportion of a given business’s 
payments to Labor and the Coalition in a given year.  Between 1998 and 2005, there 
were approximately 25,000 payments to Australian political parties, about 17,000 of 
which were from around 5,400 businesses.  A mere five per cent of firms in my 
sample made a donation every year, while 15% made a payment, whether donation or 
                                                 
3 The range is narrower for Queensland and the Commonwealth, both of which have three-year 
parliamentary terms.   
4 For the Commonwealth and five of the six states, which use the Alternative Vote, I use the two-party 
preferred voting intentions.  Tasmanian elections are held under the Single Transferable Vote (Farrell 
and McAllister 2006), so I used the first preference voting intention.  The source is the Roy Morgan 
Poll.  In a study of the 2004 federal election, Jackman (2005) finds this to be one of the less accurate 
polls.  The reason for using it is its greater coverage of all states, especially Tasmania.  I would like to 
emphasise that the poll variable aims, not to directly predict election results, but to measure attempts by 
business to predict with parties will control government. 
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other payment, every year.  61% did not make any donations in the relevant period, 
while 47% did not make any type of payment during the whole period. 
 
There is a plethora of concerns regarding the transparency of these arrangements, 
most, but not all, of which are relevant to this study.  Some of these criticisms arise 
from a desire to understand the relationship between parties and particular businesses, 
with a view to exposing potential corruption and are therefore not vital to the 
statistical approach being taken here.  One important line of criticism is that the 
disclosure tends to happen after, not during or before, an election campaign.  Again, 
this is not important for this study.  The following criticisms are possible sources of 
error in this study.  The cumulative total of payments does not have to be reported.  
Therefore, there could be many businesses, which have paid large amounts to parties 
without any disclosure requirements.  The definition of associated entity is not wide 
enough to encompass all activities and organisations that effectively fund party 
political competition.   Similarly, the definition of a donation is too narrow, leaving us 
with a large category of other payments, which clearly includes both non-political 
business transactions as well as political contributions.  In particular, the type of 
fundraising in which businesses pay large sums to attend a social event or conference 
with politicians can legally be reported as an ‘other payment’.  Finally, the electoral 
commissions do not have the resources to adequately implement the existing 
regulations.   
 
These are significant limitations on the validity of the current analysis.  However, it is 
important not to overemphasise them.  While it is impossible to estimate the extent to 
which businesses channel money to parties outside the statutory framework, the sheer 
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volume of payments disclosed and, in many instances, their size and potential for 
controversy persuades me that the official data provides a roughly accurate picture of 
overall business funding of parties.  Moreover, it is worth pointing out that, even if 
Australian requirements are no longer amongst the most demanding of rich countries, 
the general requirement for disclosure contrasts with the almost total absence of 
disclosure until recently in some countries such as Ireland and the tendency in the 
USA to restrict disclosure to campaign finance.   Crucially, even if a really large 
proportion of actual political contributions manage to evade or deceive the disclosure 
regime, the issue is whether these contributions are systematically different to the 
disclosed payments in terms of the models being tested in this article.  There are no 
obvious ways in which this might be the case. 
 
This study excludes the territories.  The Northern Territory has a different party 
system, while only one poll of voting intentions has ever been held in the Australian 
Capital Territory.  Moreover, the territories are outliers on several measures of party 
competition (Sharman and Moon 2003).  The territories represent a tiny proportion of 
both the Australian population and business contributions to parties.  The sample 
contains 22,050 observations: 450 businesses by seven years by seven jurisdictions.   
 
There is a potential sample selection effect in that the variables I use to predict 
selection into the sample of contributors are similar to those I use to explain the 
distribution of contributions amongst parties.  Unfortunately, models that correct for 
sample selection in the panel context would place such a demand on the data that it 
would be impossible to include sectoral dummies.  Furthermore, such models have 
rarely been applied and are not available in standard statistical packages (Dustmann 
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and Rochina-Barrachina 2007).  Therefore, I firstly seek to explain why businesses 
contribute and then separately explore variations in the political bias of the 
contributions that businesses make. 
 
Contributions 
To investigate the decision to contribute, I employ a pooled logit with Newey-West 
standard errors to compensate for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  I estimate 
four equations: federal donations, all payments at the federal level, state donations and 
all payments at the state level.  Three sector dummies and a number of observations 
have been dropped from the federal equations because of a lack of variation in the 
dependent variable. 
 
The four models suggest that firm behaviour is quite similar whether the federal or the 
state level is considered and whether contributions are defined by donations or all 
payments (see Table 1).  For all four models, contributions are more likely to be made 
as elections approach; larger firms are more likely to contribute and 22 to 23 of the 28 
sectors are significantly different from the reference category of Wood and Paper.  
Moreover, as shown in Table 2, the probabilities of contribution for the different 
sectors are highly correlated across the four models.  The different powers of the 
federal and state governments do not substantially change the frequency with which 
firms in different sectors contribute to political parties.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Holding income at the mean and the electoral timetable at an election year, it is 
difficult to confidently state which sectors are most likely to contribute to parties.  The 
sectors which have a probability of making a contribution of half a standard deviation 
or more over the mean in each of the four models are: Advices for Finance, 
Investment and Insurance; Services of Finance, Investment and Insurance; Wood and 
Paper.  In addition, Textiles and Clothing has a high probability of making federal 
donations and all payments, while Construction and Personal and Other Services have 
a high probability of making state donations and all payments.  These sectors tend to 
represent small numbers of firms and their coefficients do not reach statistical 
significance.   The sectors which have a probability of making a contribution half a 
standard deviation or more under the mean in each of the four models are: 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and Wholesale Personal and Household Goods.  
Both are statistically significant in every model.   In addition, the following sectors 
had a low probability of contribution in three of the four models: Electricity, Gas, 
Water, Mining; Petroleum, Chemicals, Associated Products; Retail, Personal, 
Household Goods.  Again, all were statistically significant.   
 
Bias 
The sample values indicate that, in the period under examination, Australian 
businesses have split their contributions between the two principal competitors, but 
have tended to be biased towards the Coalition.  Labor received on average 43% of a 
given business’s donation in a given year in a given jurisdiction, while it got 48% of 
all payments.  It would be a mistake to interpret these values as indicating a lack of 
ideological preference amongst Australian businesses without controlling for the 
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economic characteristics of firms and the political circumstances under which they 
have contributed to the parties.   
 
Again, i present four models (see Table 3).  This time they are estimated by ordinary 
least squares with Newey-West standard errors.  Income is expected to be associated 
with splitting between the two parties.  Testing this hypothesis requires a quadratic 
specification.  Hence the first income variable should have a positive sign, while the 
second (squared) income variable should have a negative sign.  The incumbency and 
poll variables should have positive signs as they are expected to increase the share of 
contributions going to Labor.  While we expect the 29 sectors to be associated with 
differently biased contributions, there are no clear hypotheses in one direction or the 
other. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
There are more differences in the four models of bias than there were in the models of 
contribution.  These differences may reflect the effects of different numbers of 
observations as much as they reflect different behaviour by businesses making 
financial contributions to political parties.  The two models of bias at the federal level 
suffer from serious collinearity problems amongst the sector dummies.  For this 
reason, twelve variables have been dropped from the donations equation and nine 
from the equation for all payments.  At the state level, one sector has been dropped 
from both equations for the same reason.  The economic logic is unable to provide an 
explanation for partisanship.  The income variables are only significant in the model 
for all payments at the state level.  Across the four models, between zero and four 
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sectors are significantly different from the reference category.  Only two sectors 
(Printing and Publishing and Wholesale Personal and Household Goods) are 
statistically significantly in two of the models.   
 
In contrast, the political variables perform better.  Incumbency is significant in all 
equations except federal donations, which is, after all, suffering from a lack of 
observations.  Poll is significant in two equations, the exceptions being the two 
donations equations.  Therefore, I conclude that businesses react to political 
conditions.  They concentrate their contributions on the party in government, reducing 
the bias as an election approaches.  They also direct more money to the party, which 
is ahead in the polls, increasing the bias as an election approaches. 
 
In order to clarify the implications of these findings, I present graphs of predicted bias 
under a number of simulated political conditions (see Figure 1).  This allows me to 
uncover the potentially ideological distribution of business contributions that 
underlies shifts from one party to another in reaction to political circumstances.  
Firstly, I look at incumbency, contrasting positions of maximum advantage to the two 
major blocs in Australian politics.  Under a Labor government, with four years to the 
next election, the model predicts that businesses will overwhelmingly opt to split their 
contributions, albeit with a minor overall bias towards Labor.   Under a Coalition 
government, with four years to an election, the majority of businesses will clearly bias 
their contributions towards the Coalition.  I undertook a similar procedure to uncover 
the effects of shifts in opinion poll popularity.  In an election year, if there is no 
difference between the parties in the polls, over half of businesses will bias 
contributions towards the Coalition.  Heading into an election with a ten-point lead 
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the ALP can only expect to share business contributions equally.  However, with the 
same ten-point lead in an election year, the Coalition can expect that over ninety per 
cent of businesses will bias their contributions towards the Liberals and the Nationals.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Essentially, political competition and ideological predilection interact as follows: if 
Labor has the political advantage, the dominant strategy of businesses will be split 
their contributions between the ALP and the Liberal-National coalition.  If the 
Coalition has the political advantage, the dominant strategy will be to clearly bias 
payments towards the Coalition.  Australian business combines a pragmatic reaction 
to changing political circumstances with a massive ideological bias towards the more 
conservative parties.  Without controlling for political competition, it is not possible 
to come up with a reasonable estimate of the importance of the ideological factor.  
The sample values indicate a relatively even split between the two adversaries (with a 
minor preference for the Coalition).  However, this is on the basis of a period where 
the Coalition has only had a mean poll advantage in one out of 49 jurisdiction years 
(Victoria 1999) and has been in government for only 11 out of 49 jurisdiction years 
(seven years in the Commonwealth, three in Victoria and one in South Australia).  
The apparent ‘even-handedness’ of Australian business has been a reaction to the 
political dominance of Labor.   
 
Interestingly, current newspaper reports on fundraising in anticipation of the next 
Commonwealth election suggest that business behaviour conforms very closely to my 
model.  According to my prediction, a clear ALP advantage in the polls in an election 
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year should motivate business to split its contributions relatively equally between the 
government and the opposition.  The Australian reports that, ‘Conservative fundraiser 
… Brisbane-based Everald Compton said that donors who traditionally funded only 
the Coalition parties were now taking “an each-way punt”’ (Franklin and Karvelas 
2007).  Similarly, The Canberra Times reports that Liberal Party Honorary Secretary 
Mark Bethwaite says, ‘[T]he even-handedness of some businesses in supporting both 
the Liberal Party and the ALP is not something that I applaud’ (AAP 2007).  It would 
be wrong to reify these comments and interpret them as a consistent business strategy.  
Instead, as I have shown, these comments probably represent a reaction to a particular 
ephemeral political situation.   
 
 
Conclusions 
The regulatory environment and democratic implications of Australian business 
funding of parties have been lucidly discussed.  However, this is the first systematic 
attempt to understand the calculations Australian businesses make when considering 
financial contributions to political parties.  Contributions are made according to 
economic, political and ideological logics.  Businesses are more likely to contribute as 
an election approaches.  The economic logic is important in explaining which 
businesses contribute.  The larger the business the more likely it is to contribute.  The 
probability of contribution also varies from sector to sector.  In contrast, the economic 
logic does little to explain the partisan distribution of contributions.  This is best 
explained by an interaction of political and ideological logics.  Australian business has 
a strong underlying ideological predilection towards the conservative coalition of the 
Liberals and Nationals.  Nonetheless, they react strongly to changing political 
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conditions.  If the ALP has the political advantage, in terms of either control of 
government or a lead in the polls, business tends to be even handed.  By contrast, if 
the Coalition has the political advantage businesses target the vast majority of their 
money on the Coalition.   
 
The literature is understandably replete with complaints that the existing regulatory 
regime hampers systematic study, as indeed it does.  However, the use of associated 
entities and the excessively narrow definition of a donation, have not prevented this 
research from gaining an understanding of the calculations of Australian business in 
general.  The conclusion that the partisan bias of all payments, including donations 
and non-donations, is highly dependent on political circumstances suggest that most 
non-donations are actually political contributions and can, in the aggregate, be treated 
as such for analytical purposes.  Further quantitative work is both possible and 
desirable.  The raising of the threshold for disclosure of a payment from 1,500 to 
10,000 Australian dollars may undermine the validity of future quantitative work, as 
this threshold would have excluded many of the payments analysed in this article.  In 
my opinion, an even more desirable complement to this research would be a 
systematic qualitative study.  It is probably only by interviews that political scientists 
can hope to really understand the mechanics of access in Australian business-political 
relations.  Numerous studies have elicited a remarkable amount of co-operation from 
senior businesspeople on sensitive political issues in a variety of countries (Heinz, et 
al. 1993; Kadushin 1995; McMenamin 2004; Useem 1984) and at least one that has 
managed to obtain frank responses on political access in the USA (Clawson, et al. 
1998). 
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Table 1. Decision to Contribute 
 Federal Donations 
Federal All 
Payments 
State 
Donations 
State All 
Payments 
Electoral Timetable -.348906 (.091085)** 
-.198998 
(.070773)** 
-.27787 
(.038373)** 
-.133874 
(.024941)** 
Income .1017 (.0159)** 
.1955 
(.0245)** 
.07 
(.000006)** 
.1074 
(.000006)** 
Advices for Finance, 
Investment, Insurance 
.186316 
(.5909) 
.445081 
(.560821) 
.52823 
(.325294)       
.639176 
(.25991)* 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
-3.08837   
(1.13643 )** 
-2.4713   
(.846569)** 
-3.07571   
(1.0343)** 
-2.61479   
(.617027)** 
Building Materials -1.16392   (.546154)* 
-1.24683   
(.491006)* 
-.65055  
(.328904)* 
-.586723    
(.25402)* 
Communication Services -4.1528   (1.12365)** 
-2.68731   
(.641647)** 
-2.67603   
(.65059)** 
-1.32488   
(.288367)** 
Construction -1.6405   (.517865)** 
-1.65425   
(.467171)** 
-.24329 
(.28694)     
-.262402 
(.227196) 
Cultural, Recreational 
Services 
-2.1357 
(.585397)** 
-1.35715   
(.496815)** 
-.933282   
(.312057)** 
-.852473   
(.252251)** 
Electricity, Gas, Water -3.7648   (.737462)** 
-2.23557   
(.489709)** 
-2.1665   
(.375122)** 
-1.17759   
(.242171)** 
Finance, Investment -2.04098   (.510323)** 
-1.58653   
(.439437)** 
-.759382    
(.28418)** 
-.353752 
(.21969) 
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 
-1.4681   
(.491569)** 
-1.35635   
(.441111)** 
-.78187   
(.285238)** 
-.915328   
(.226458)** 
Health, Community 
Services 
-1.46674   
(.60617)* 
-1.08457    
(.52131)* 
-1.5623   
(.464236)** 
-1.03462   
(.303174)** 
Insurance -2.42807   (.566272)** 
-2.30904   
(.502213)** 
-1.58455   
(.337726)** 
-1.15089   
(.243632)** 
Machinery, Equipment -3.70067   (.643411)** 
-2.33009   
(.470124)** 
-1.7735   
(.31278)** 
-1.15676    
(.22903)** 
Metal Products -1.63018   (.590241)** 
-1.53631   
(.529358)** 
-1.47641   
(.413283)** 
-1.72772   
(.332505)** 
Mining -3.6771   (.789797)** 
-2.42107   
(.591277)** 
-2.20707   
(.390842)** 
-1.45126   
(.260381)** 
Other Manufacturing Dropped Dropped -1.67418   (.761434)* 
-1.6097   
(.55311)** 
Personal, Other Services Dropped Dropped .275222 (.515983)  
.7246 
(.384962) 
Petroleum, Chemicals, 
Associated Products 
-3.01864   
(.566409)** 
-2.0368   
(.466956)** 
-1.75578   
(.318257)** 
-1.5648   
(.24088)** 
Printing, Publishing -3.53953   (1.10237)** 
-1.7587   
(.59411)** 
-2.10535   
(.567571)** 
-1.03725   
(.307177)** 
Property, Business 
Services 
-2.5396   
(.512138)** 
-2.02123   
(.440171)** 
-.660544   
(.275179)* 
-.256697 
(.214796) 
Retail, Food -2.39046   (.658281)** 
-2.5007   
(.764184)** 
-.553583 
(.30289)        
-1.11558 
(.26305)** 
Retail, Motor Vehicle 
Services Dropped Dropped 
-3.63536   
(.754231)** 
-2.47457   
(.353608)** 
Retail, Personal, 
Household Goods 
-3.92341   
(.843821)** 
-3.62647   
(.713982)** 
-2.27005   
(.410647)** 
-2.38122   
(.320644)** 
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Services to Finance, 
Investment, Insurance 
-1.22525 
(.718522) 
-.58748 
(.628527) 
-.29521 
(.405188)       
.280568 
(.293921) 
Textiles, Clothing -.43777 (.649894) 
-.54509 
(.625858) 
-1.35605   
(.568474)* 
-1.57643   
(.466928)** 
Transport, Storage -1.84109 (.552503)** 
-1.76881   
(.493813)** 
-1.69879   
(.382062)** 
-1.45262   
(.273785)** 
Wholesale, Basic 
Materials 
-2.50101   
(.560257)** 
-2.70245   
(.513236)** 
-2.37723   
(.399749)** 
-2.17453   
(.284148)** 
Wholesale, Machinery, 
Motor Vehicles 
-4.44877   
(.739524)** 
-4.28124   
(.651659)** 
-3.0168   
(.389454)** 
-2.30806   
(.255424)** 
Wholesale, Personal, 
Household Goods 
-4.74532   
(1.10084)** 
-4.17645   
(.822083)** 
-3.31013    
(.56495)** 
-2.28706   
(.30279)** 
Constant .35253 (.486865) 
.16756 
(.433338) 
-1.43453 
(.274926)**    
-1.12466 
(.216926)** 
Chi2 227.40** 247.38** 602.52** 1169.41** 
Observations 3031 3031 18900 18900 
Notes: Coefficients from pooled logit with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  * Significant at 
the 0.05 level.  ** Coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.  No firms in Other Manufacturing, Personal 
and Other Services and Retail, Motor Vehicle Services made payments at the Commonwealth level.  
The dummies for these sectors have been dropped along with 119 observations 
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Table 2. Similarity of sectoral probabilities of contribution 
 Donations Payments 
Federal and State 0.8011 0.7847 
 Federal State 
Donations and All Payments 0.9548 0.9405 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients of sectoral probabilities of 
contributing with income held constant at the mean and the electoral 
timetable held constant at an election year.  N=26 for all correlations, 
except State Donations and All payments for which N=29. 
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Table 3. Distribution of Contribution 
 Federal Donations 
Federal All 
Payments 
State 
Donations 
State All 
Payments 
Incumbency .018529    (.014477) 
.022344 
(.009571)* 
.028574 
(.009554)**  
.019151 
(.006122)** 
Poll .000522 (.001015)      
.003374 
(.000702)** 
.00013 
(.000612)       
.002639 
(.00042)**  
Income .0075 (.0205)   
-.00972 
(.00973) 
.0104 
(.00708) 
.0159 
(.00547)**  
Income2 -.000001 (.000001) 
.000000 
(.000000) 
-.000000 
(.000000) 
-.000001 
(.000000)** 
Advices for Finance, 
Investment, Insurance 
.238617 
(.242445)        
.076535 
(.212573) 
.074495 
(.124184)    
-.005616 
(.09437)        
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing Dropped Dropped 
-.08942 
(.177811)       
.009569 
(.179046)        
Building Materials .083897    (.127889)      
.028743 
(.109194) 
.107769 
(.13412)        
-.029556 
(.107408)       
Communication Services Dropped Dropped .335666 (.241973)       
-.027837 
(.116722)       
Construction .037522 (.15239)         
.176822 
(.118464) 
.081023 
(.109565)       
.069078 
(.088281)        
Cultural, Recreational 
Services 
.197926 
(.221772)        
.269811 
(.18248) 
.102149 
(.115133)       
.032927 
(.090913)        
Electricity, Gas, Water .050122 (.15019)         
.17094 
(.113318) 
.348513 
(.2005)         
-.005679 
(.136721)       
Finance, Investment .028757 (.13012)         
.098274 
(.104768) 
.024145 
(.11454)        
-.101334 
(.089766)     
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 
-.085301 
(.140739)       
-.02853 
(.119727) 
.008705 
(.106912)       
-.102891 
(.08775)        
Health, Community 
Services Dropped Dropped 
-.052296 
(.148467)       
-.202955 
(.11012)        
Insurance .173269    (.13311)      
.080246 
(.1119) 
-.27978 
(.16974)        
-.215369 
(.110592)       
Machinery, Equipment -.178 (.180172)       
-.03806 
(.1369) 
-.006914 
(.125533)       
-.007953 
(.098092)       
Metal Products Dropped Dropped .030429 (.14729)        
-.058286 
(.127304)       
Mining Dropped -.154822 (.277072) 
.1083 
(.14239)        
-.086378 
(.099784)       
Other Manufacturing Dropped Dropped .588793 (.101739)** 
.174404 
(.169308)        
Personal, Other Services Dropped Dropped .192558 (.205487)       
.115095 
(.132284)        
Petroleum, Chemicals, 
Associated Products 
-.041443 
(.189497)    
-.023987 
(.142054) 
-.026181 
(.13)        
-.079169 
(.099819)       
Printing, Publishing .232944 (.32047)         
.415369 
(.158195)** 
-.435036 
(.100011)**  
.048314 
(.117572)        
Property, Business 
Services 
-.028611 
(.15605)        
.009277 
(.12105) 
.007116 
(.105584)       
.01778 
(.08456)        
Retail, Food Dropped Dropped .02668 (.133374)       
.008676 
(.105585)        
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Retail, Motor Vehicle 
Services Dropped 
.307388 
(.149027)* 
.100446 
(.367271)       
.071067 
(.22376)        
Retail, Personal, 
Household Goods 
.035903 
(.280859)        
.100157 
(.24353) 
-.215535 
(.172864) 
-.102248 
(.144154)       
Services to Finance, 
Investment, Insurance 
-.135193 
(.171569)       
.00449 
(.135163) Dropped Dropped 
Textiles, Clothing Dropped Dropped -.14771 (.136345) 
-.122507 
(.143553)       
Transport, Storage Dropped Dropped .272016 (.134445)* 
.043869 
(.104678)        
Wholesale, Basic 
Materials Dropped 
.547804 
(.112078)** 
-.02932 
(.124154) 
-.068665 
(.108875) 
Wholesale, Machinery, 
Motor Vehicles 
-.296084 
(.169903) 
-.164448 
(.137119) 
-.084698 
(.23381) 
.078354 
(.123675) 
Wholesale, Personal, 
Household Goods 
-.431077 
(.141001)** 
-.397318 
(.126838)** 
-.059123 
(.27778) 
-.050389 
(.140797) 
Constant .316553 (.16253) 
.208511 
(.119571) 
.23113 
(.109417)* 
.296642 
(.089078)** 
F 8.47** 50.33** 78.22** 3.88** 
Observations 273 580 721 1582 
Notes: Coefficients from pooled OLS with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  * Significant 
at the 0.05 level.  ** Coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.   
 
  23
 
Figure 1: Simulated partisanship of business contributions 
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Note: Fitted values from model for all payments at state level in Table N.  Incumbency=8 for all 
observations. 
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Note: Fitted values from model for all payments at state level in Table N.  Incumbency=1 for all 
observations. 
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Note: Fitted values from model for all payments at state level in Table N.  Poll=0 for all 
observations. 
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Note: Fitted values from model for all payments at state level in Table N.  Poll=40 for all 
observations. 
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Note: Fitted values from model for all payments at state level in Table N.  Poll=-40 for all 
observations. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Continuous variables 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Obs. 
Income (billions AUS$) 0.147 40.85 1.51 3.7 22050 
Incumbency 1 8 5.61 1.87 22050 
Poll -8.625 77.45 29.91 20.17 22050 
Bias (Donations) 0 1 .435 .412 994 
Bias (All Payments) 0 1 .482 .415 2162 
 Percentage positive  
Contribution (Donation) 4.5 22050 
Contribution (All Payments) 9.8 22050 
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Table A2: Firms per sector 
 
Advices for Finance, Investment, Insurance 4 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 4 
Building Materials 9 
Communication Services 5 
Construction 19 
Cultural, Recreational Services 15 
Electricity, Gas, Water 22 
Finance, Investment 27 
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 31 
Health, Community Services 6 
Insurance 18 
Machinery, Equipment 34 
Metal Products 8 
Mining 16 
Other Manufacturing 2 
Personal, Other Services 1 
Petroleum, Chemicals, Associated Products 31 
Printing, Publishing 6 
Property, Business Services 47 
Retail, Food 7 
Retail, Motor Vehicle Services 98 
Retail, Personal, Household Goods 18 
Services to Finance, Investment, Insurance 3 
Textiles, Clothing 3 
Transport, Storage 12 
Wholesale, Basic Materials 20 
Wholesale, Machinery, Motor Vehicles 45 
Wholesale, Personal, Household Goods 20 
Wood, Paper 3 
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